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DODD-FRANK AND BASEL III’S SKIN IN THE
GAME DIVERGENCE AND WHY IT IS GOOD FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM
ERIC THOMPSON†
ABSTRACT
The recent financial collapse has illuminated many problems with the global
financial system. One of these problems was that the financial system developed in a
way that allowed banks to profit by simply making more loans instead of quality
loans. After the financial collapse, regulators scrambled to enact new legislation to
better manage the financial system and avoid the problems that caused the collapse.
One way in which regulators attempted to improve the system was to remove the
ability of banks to generate limitless loans in which the banks had no stake. Two
such pieces of regulation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act and the new provisions in the Basel Accords (Basel III), attempted to
limit the ability of banks to make endless loans. Although the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk
retention requirement does a better job in this respect, having diverging systems of
international regulation may prove to be beneficial.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Originate to Distribute (OTD) system of banking changes the incentives of
the banking system from that of traditional banking. By originating the mortgages
and selling the income streams from them, banks generate large amounts of revenue
from the fees associated with the transactions. 1 Although there are caveats, this
basic structure allows banks to divorce their success from that of the mortgages
themselves.2 Securitization itself has many benefits, but one downside in the OTD
model is that it gives banks incentives to generate as many mortgages as possible,
sell them and repeat, a process that will hereinafter be referred to as “churning”.3
Churning led to banks producing many bad loans such as subprime loans, NINJA
loans, and liar loans, and when these bad loans defaulted in and around 2007, the
financial industry collapsed.4 A lot of the new regulation targets capital and reserve
requirements. However, capital and reserve requirements do not greatly inhibit a
bank’s ability to churn because a bank can sell its mortgage payment streams and
return capital to its balance sheets, meeting regulatory requirements.
In response to the recent financial collapse, two prominent pieces of regulation
have been passed: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act5 (Dodd-Frank Act) and the 2010 revisions to the Basel Accords6 (Basel III).
Both of these pieces of legislation attempt to address the new financial challenges in
different ways. In response to the OTD model, the Dodd-Frank Act requires firms
that securitize to retain a portion of the risk of the mortgages. 7 This requirement is
commonly referred to as “skin in the game” because it forces banks to retain an

1

See Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the
Originate to Distribute Model of Bank Credit 2 (Working Paper, Nov. 2008), available at
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1290312.
2
See Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Financial
Regulation and Securitization: Evidence from Subprime Loans 1 (Working Paper, Feb. 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346131.
3

See id. at 3.

4

See id. at 1.

5

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
6
Compilation of Documents That Form the Global Regulatory Framework for Capital
and Liquidity, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/list/basel3/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter BIS Documents].
7

See Dodd-Frank, supra note 5, § 941, Sec. 15G(c)(1)(B)(i).
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interest in the mortgages. 8 This forces banks to retain some of the risk of the loans
defaulting, aligning the interest of the originators and investors. 9 Basel III has no
such provision and instead attempts to control the OTD model through capital
requirements and other techniques.10 The Dodd-Frank Act’s skin in the game
provision appears to do a better job of solving the problems created by churning by
aligning originator and investor interests while leaving the actual investment
decisions to the market. However, a growing body of literature suggests that by
having different regulatory systems, financial innovators cannot game the systems as
easily, and risk and downturns will be less systemic.11 Additionally, by having
separate systems, regulators can attempt different strategies to see which allow for
the greatest growth while still maintaining trust and solvency in the market. 12
II. THE ORIGINATE TO DISTRIBUTE MODEL13
Securitization is a complex process that can have many variations. Although the
description below does not hold for all securitization transactions, the basic structure
of the deal will be relatively similar.
The process begins with banks making loans to borrowers. 14 The loans are
purchased by intermediaries that design and create the securitization (this step will
be the focus of this paper, and as such, it is discussed in more detail below). 15
Originators pool the loans which are then transferred to an entity called a Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV).16 Ideally, the transfer will be a true sale in which the
originating bank no longer holds a stake in the receivables; this step is necessary to
protect investors in the SPV should the originator go bankrupt. 17 Collateral and
other credit enhancement techniques are usually used to help prevent the risk of
default for the receivables.18 The SPV segments its receivables into tranches which
8

See Howell E Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A
Problem with Three Dimensions 3 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 10-40 (2010), available
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/moving_forward_symposium/conference_drafts/3-2_jackson.
pdf.
9
10

See id.
See generally BIS Documents, supra note 6.

11

See Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment 2
(Yale Program for Stud. in Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol’y Research Paper No. 414, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348.
12

See id. at 16–17.

13

For a model of a basic originate to distribute model, see Appendix A.

14

See TAMAR FRANKEL, 1 SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET
POOLS, AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES §2.1 (2nd ed. 2005) [hereinafter FRANKEL,
SECURITIZATION].
15

See id. §§ 3.3-3.4.

16

See id. § 2.1.

17

See TAMAR FRANKEL & MARK FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ‒
SECURITIZATION AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES: LAW, PROCESS, CASE STUDIES, AND
SIMULATIONS 232 (2009) [hereinafter FRANKEL & FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM].
18

See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, § 2.1.
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have different levels of risk and payout. 19 The SPV then issues the securities and
market intermediaries sell them.20 For a diagram of a basic securitization
transaction, see Appendix A.
As noted earlier, the part of the securitization transaction where the loans are
purchased from the by bank intermediaries in exchange for capital is an important
part of the transaction.21 When it receives the liquid capital, the bank will record the
transaction as a gain or a loss.22 In addition to the capital they receive, the banks
receive a fee for the transaction.23 Because banks now have liquid capital on their
books, they are able to use these assets to make more loans. 24 This process can be
repeated over and over again and the capital is simply churned through the bank
while the bank makes its profits from the fees. 25 For a diagram of the process of
churning, see Appendix B.
III. BENEFITS AND HARM FROM SECURITIZATION
A. Benefits
Securitization is a complex financial transaction, and although it has received a
lot of bad press lately, investors, borrowers, and originators can still realize many
benefits from its use. Securitization provides originators access to cheaper capital
than debt or equity markets.26 Securitization allows lenders to make more loans than
they otherwise would.27 This allows the banks to earn more money28 and provides
access to loans for those who otherwise would not have access. 29 Securitization also
gives more investors access to the mortgage market. Normally, small investors
would not be able to vet individual mortgages, nor would they be able to meet
19

See id.

20

See id.

21

See id. §§ 3.3-3.4.

22

See Patricia M. Dechow, Linda A. Myers, & Catherine Shakespeare, Fair Value
Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient Earnings Management Tool
with Compensation Side-Benefits 2 (Working Paper, Feb. 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1111594.
23

See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, §§ 3.3-3.4.

24

See id.

25

See id.

26

See Stephen Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, LEVERHULME LECTURES,
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 4 (Nov. 11, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1707053 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Future of Securitization].
27

See id.

28

See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, §§ 3.3-3.4.

29

See FRANKEL & FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 24
(referencing Ivo Kolev, Financial Policy Forum ‒ Derivatives Study Center, Primer:
Mortgage-Backed Securities, FINANCIALPOLICY.ORG (July 29, 2004), available at
http://www.financialpolicy.org/fpfprimermbs.htm).
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individual clients without becoming a specialist.30 Securitization removes these
barriers by creating easily tradable securities. 31 Finally, securitization gives
borrowers access to cheaper capital as the reduced transaction costs are passed on to
the borrower.32
B. Harms
With the aforementioned benefits, securitization has shown its ability to incur
substantial harm. Securitization contributed largely to the subprime mortgage crisis
which propelled the recent financial collapse. 33 The process of securitization caused
the moral hazard whereby banks had an incentive to generate as many mortgages as
possible, and, therefore, generated many low-quality mortgages on which the
borrowers later defaulted.34 Because the mortgage lenders did not have to live with
the credit consequences of their loans and the lenders were able to churn loans, their
standards fell.35 Because securitization is such a complex process with many parties,
and many underlying assets, investors heavily, if not overly, relied on rating agencies
to assess the risk of the securities.36 Unfortunately, the rating agencies did not
succeed in accurately assessing the risk of many of these loans, and the unknowing
investors incurred large losses.37 There were also problems with servicing the loans
when the loans were securitized because the servicers typically did not have power
to renegotiate the loans, but it would have been in everyone’s interest for the loans to
be renegotiated.
When a bank holds loans, if a problem arises, the bank can simply renegotiate
with the borrower and come to a compromise to optimize the income. 38 With
securitization, servicers generally are supposed to have limited duties, and are not in
a position to renegotiate.39 Among the many reasons why the servicers are only
given limited duties, one is that the securitization is based off of the original terms of
the loans, and changing the cash flow and value of the loan changes the value of the
securitization. The original bank may have the ability to renegotiate, but has no
stake in the loan anymore.40 The original bank may be unable or unwilling to
conduct a negotiation.41 The end investor in the SPV’s securities has no ability to

30

See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, § 1.3.

31

See id.

32

See id. § 5.3.

33

See Schwarcz, Future of Securitization, supra note 26, at 2.

34

See id.

35

See id. at 7.

36

See id. at 5.

37

See id.

38

See id. at 9.

39

See id. at 10.

40

See id. at 9.

41

See id.
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renegotiate individual loans, and is unlikely to have the resources to do so anyway. 42
Although it might be beneficial for all parties with a vested interest for the terms of a
loan to be renegotiated, there is no reasonable way in which to do so. 43
IV. HOW THE OTD MODEL ALLOWS BANKS TO MEET CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Many commentators have stated that the OTD model of banking makes firms
more risky by making them more leveraged. Professor Margaret Blair claims that
banks “could invest in mortgage-backed securities . . . on a more highly leveraged
basis than they could when investing directly in mortgages.” 44 Dr. Marianne Ojo
states that “[i]n response to the recent Financial Crisis and to the realization that
capital levels (which banks operated with) during the period of the Crisis were
insufficient and also lacking in quality.” 45 Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, similarly claims that “[a]s a
result, banks had to raise capital and deleverage their trading books in the midst of
the crisis.”46 However, this understanding fails to comprehend what occurs in the
OTD method of lending. Although banks may have been overleveraged in the time
leading to the financial crisis, it was not a result of the OTD model. The OTD model
allowed banks to easily increase their capital by selling the interest in the receivables
for cash or some other liquid capital.47 If anything, the OTD model allows banks to
be less leveraged and circumvent capital requirements by churning. 48 By raising
capital requirements, as many regulators have proposed, banks may have an
incentive to churn a greater amount of loans because they will be even further
restricted from making profits using traditional banking methods. For a graphical
representation of how the OTD model allows firms to use securitization to increase
their capital, see Appendix B.

42

See id.

43

See id.

44

Margaret Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles, and the Distribution of
Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 242 (2010).
45
Marianne Ojo, Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress Made
by the Basel Committee in Relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased
Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital, 2 (Sept. 22, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680886.
46

Hervé Hannoun, Deputy GM, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 45th SEACEN Governors’
Conference: Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework 10 (Feb. 26-27, 2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf.
47
See Gianfranco A. Vento & Pasquale La Ganga, Bank Liquidity Risk Management and
Supervision: Which Lessons from Recent Market Turmoil?, 10 J. OF MONEY, INVESTMENT AND
BANKING 79, 106, n. 50 (2009), available at http://www.eurojournals.com/jmib_10_06.pdf.
48

See Berndt, supra note 1, at 2.
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V. SKIN IN THE GAME
A. Description of Skin in the Game
A general definition of skin in the game is the concept of creating a situation to
ensure that corporations are managed by like-minded individuals who share a stake
in the company.49 In the securitization context, skin in the game refers to a
requirement that originators or sponsors retain a portion of the loans and securities
they create, thus also retaining some of the risk. 50 In theory, this would align the
incentives of the banks with the goals of the investors of the SPVs because the banks
are also invested in the final outcome. 51 By forcing the bank to retain an interest in
the loans it securitizes, the bank will be less likely to create a bad loan because any
failures of the loans will affect the end securities issued by the SPV, and therefore
the bank that is required to hold some of them.
There are different ways to structure the skin in the game retention. One way is
for the banks to retain an interest in each individual loan that they issue. 52 Howell E.
Jackson believes that this is not an optimal method because it complicates the
valuation exercise for investors in the loan pools.53 This would also give two entities
an interest in each loan and would complicate the renegotiation process. 54 Another
method of requiring skin in the game is to require the banks to retain an interest in
the securitization pool itself. 55 The most likely method of doing this would be for
the bank to hold a pro-rata share of all of the tranches issued by the SPV so that it is
exposed to all of the levels of risk that are issued.56 This method more directly aligns
the interests of the originators and sponsors to the interests of the investors in the
SPV.57 For a graphical representation of a bank’s assets when there is skin in the
game, see Appendix B.
B. Benefits of Skin in the Game
In theory, skin in the game is a good way to prevent the bad loans that can
originate from securitization. Although it is hard prove this empirically, many
authors have investigated the effects of having skin in the game and have found that
it aligns incentives and interests in practice. Economist Benjamin Keys and others
found that the current system of broker compensation based on fees encourages
brokers to maximize the volume of the loans they originate instead of the quality.58
49

See Definition of Skin in the Game, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/skininthegame.asp#axzz1mJ8q1Lgj (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
50

See Jackson, supra note 8, at 6.

51

See id.

52

See id. at 24.

53

See id.

54

See id.

55

See id.

56

See id.

57

See id.

58

See Keys, supra note 2, at 3.
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This is compared to regulations that require brokers to have skin in the game, which
were found to curb this moral hazard problem. 59 Professors Antje Berndt and
Anurag Gupta found that loans that are securitized underperform similar loans that
are not securitized.60 The authors believe that this underperformance is due to the
diminished relationship between the borrowers and the banks. 61 Professor
Amiyatosh Purnanandam came to a similar conclusion in his study which found that
loans made in the OTD model were of inferior quality because banks that heavily
used OTD created loans with higher default rates than banks that did not use the
OTD model.62 Finally, Thomas Hildebrand, Manju Puri, and Jörg Rocholl found
that online lending networks work better when the person recommending the loan
has a stake in a fraction of the loan.63 Through these studies, the authors show how
skin in the game regulations appear to lead to the generation of higher quality loans.
VI. DESCRIPTION OF THE REGULATIONS
A. Dodd-Frank
The Dodd-Frank Act is binding legislation that applies to all U.S. banks. 64 The
Act is an in depth bill that attempts to restore accountability and responsibility in the
financial sector through multiple avenues. 65 The Dodd-Frank Act created a new
independent watchdog to ensure consumers get clear and accurate information. 66
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act created a safe way to liquidate failed financial
firms by imposing tough new capital and leverage requirements that make it
undesirable for a bank to get too large.67 The Dodd-Frank Act created a council to
identify and address systemic risk posed by large, complex companies, products, and
activities before they threaten the stability of the economy. 68 The Dodd-Frank Act
eliminated loopholes that allow risky and abusive practices to go unnoticed and
unregulated.69 The Act provides shareholders with a say on pay and corporate affairs
59

See id. at 21.

60

See Berndt, supra note 1, at 23.

61

See id.

62

See Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 3–4 (May 11, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1167786.
63

See Thomas Hildebrand, Manju Puri & Jörg Rocholl, Skin in the Game: Evidence from
the Online Lending Market, Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting 1, 25 (Oct.
2010), http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/feaconference/docs/Session3PuriSkinintheGame.pdf.
64

See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 5.

65
See Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 111TH CONG. 1 (2010), http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_
Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
66

See id.

67

See id.

68

See id.

69

See id. at 2.
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with a non-binding vote on executive compensation and golden parachutes. 70 The
Dodd-Frank Act provides tough new rules for transparency and accountability for
credit rating agencies to protect investors and businesses. 71 The Dodd-Frank Act
also strengthens oversight and empowers regulators to aggressively pursue financial
fraud, conflicts of interest, and manipulation of the system.72
In addition to the aforementioned provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act has a
requirement that the originators retain five percent of the credit risk in securitized
assets.73 This requirement is subject to many qualifications, but will hold for many
mortgage backed securities. This provision is important because it requires
originators to retain skin in the game. Whether or not five percent is an optimal
retention is beyond the scope of this paper, but what is important is that the Act
requires some retention.
B. Basel III
The Basel III reforms are a set of non-binding financial regulations written by the
Basel Committee’s Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision that
are, in practice, followed by many banks throughout the world.74 Basel III contains
both micro-policy measures and macro-policy measures, but it is less comprehensive
than the Dodd-Frank Act.75
Basel III’s micro-policy measures attempt to regulate the actions of individual
banks. Basel III requires a substantial increase in the quality of the capital held by
banks.76 Banks must hold appropriate capital for less liquid, credit-sensitive assets
with much longer holding periods. Basel III claims that securitization exposures will
be subject to capital charges more consistent with those for the banking book.77
Basel III requires high capital levels to absorb the types of losses associated with
crises, similar to the one recently experienced. 78 It requires a global liquidity
standard to supplement capital regulations. 79 Specifically, there will be a
requirement for banks to be able to withstand a thirty-day system-wide liquidity

70

See id.

71

See id.

72

See id.

73

See Dodd-Frank, supra note 5, § 941, Sec. 15G(c)(1)(B)(i).

74

See generally BIS Documents, supra note 6; Ezra Klein, Why You Should Care About
Basel III, WASH. POST (July 27, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezraklein/2010/07/why_you_should_care_about_base.html.
75

See Stefan Walter, Basel III and Financial Stability, Speech at the Fifth Biennial
Conference on Risk Management and Supervision, 2 (Nov. 3-4, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm).
76

See id.

77

See id.

78

See id.

79

See id. at 3.
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shock as well as maintain a more robust structural liquidity profile. 80 Also included
are stronger supervision, risk management, and disclosure standards.81
Basel III’s macro-policies attempt to make economies less sensitive to risk.
Basel III introduces a leverage ratio that will help to contain the compression of the
risk-based requirement.82 Basel III also adds measures to raise the capital levels of
banks in good times so that they can be drawn down in periods of stress to reduce
procyclicality.83 It also will require global systemic banks to have additional loss
absorbency capacity beyond the base Basel III requirements. 84
For the purposes of this paper, it is instructive to note that nowhere in Basel III is
there a risk retention requirement.85 As a result, Basel III does not require banks to
have any skin in the game when securitizing. 86
VII. DIVERGENCE ON SKIN IN THE GAME REGULATION
There are many differences between the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III
regulations that could be compared and contrasted, but the presence, or lack, of risk
retention is an important difference between the two. One major problem in the
recent financial downturn was that mortgages with an active secondary market
systemically underperformed. 87 Many actors and factors have been blamed for this.
Rating agencies are blamed for failing to identify the risks associated with the loan
pools.88 Mortgage brokers are blamed for abusing the system and either purposefully
or negligently arranging loans for unqualified individuals lacking proper
paperwork.89 The insufficiency, or complexity, of the information is also blamed for
preventing investors and the market from independently evaluating the investments
in asset backed securities.90
One way that the problems associated with securitization could be avoided is to
align the market incentives so that all parties have the same objectives and then
allow the market to take care of the transactions. As discussed above, some authors
80

See id.

81

See id.

82

See id.

83

See id. at 4.

84

See id.

85

See generally Walter, supra note 75; see also BIS Documents, supra note 6.

86

See generally Walter, supra note 75; see also BIS Documents, supra note 6.

87

See Berndt, supra note 1, at 5.

88

See generally David J. Reiss, Ratings Failure: The Need For a Consumer Protection
Agenda in Rating Agency Regulation (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
154, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1439748.
89

See Cassandra Jones Harvard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad Loans
Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86
UTAH L. REV. 737, 742-43 (2008).
90

See generally Steven Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure].
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have indicated that introducing skin in the game incentives will be effective in
increasing the quality of loans and would prevent poor performance practices. It
also makes intuitive sense that skin in the game would work. If an originator is
required to bear some of the risk of the loan defaulting, the originator will have a
greater incentive to make sure its processes will generate profitable loans instead of
as many loans as possible.
A. The Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act takes into consideration the need to align market incentives
by requiring a five percent risk retention. This aligns the bank’s motives with that of
the investors. There are exceptions to the five percent retention rule, 91 but it is
unclear whether or not five percent is an optimal retention amount.
Despite all of the benefits involved in requiring risk retention, there is a
downside to the rule. Just as securitization helped free bank assets and aided many
people in receiving loans, requiring risk retention may lead to reduced lending in the
future. Additionally, the fees associated with securitization may compensate banks
enough that even a complete loss of five percent of their investment would not be a
disincentive.
B. Basel III
Basel III lacks a five percent risk retention requirement. Basel III focuses on
capital requirements and regulating the banks, but it does not address the benefits of
requiring skin in the game. Non-U.S. banks issuing securities will not have the same
motivations to issue quality securities because of their lack of skin in the game. 92
The lack of originator incentives will require the investors to conduct more costly
investigation to assure that the securities they are purchasing are good investments. 93
Despite the harms that a lack of skin in the game can bring, there are benefits as
well. Without the need to have skin in the game, banks can make more loans which
not only allow them to earn more money, but allow more people to receive loans.
This will free up capital markets that have been chilled as a result of the recent
financial collapse.
VIII. INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
There exists a clear divergence between Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act with
regard to whether banks should be required to maintain risk retention. With this
divergence in regulatory framework, some commentators believe that it is optimal
for regulatory frameworks to converge. 94 In light of this, it is important to ask
whether the two frameworks should converge, and if so, which regulation should be
chosen.
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A. Benefits of International Regulatory Convergence
International regulatory convergence would lead to simplified communication
and information sharing because less investigation would be necessary in order to
invest in a jurisdiction with identical rules.95 Where there is convergence on
securitization regulation, the transaction costs of U.S. investors are reduced. 96 When
there is not convergence, investors must hire lawyers and bankers to investigate
business operations, disclosure documents, and the regulatory environment of the
jurisdictions in which they intend to invest. 97 Investors will find it easier to invest
across borders and diversify their portfolios where regulations have converged. By
having international financial regulatory convergence, investors and borrowers
benefit through increased and cheaper credit. To some extent, regulatory
convergence is a precondition for financial market integration, and as finance
continues to flow across borders, there is a growing need for financial regulators in
different jurisdictions to collaborate.98
When international regulatory convergence occurs, multiple regulators from
different backgrounds and jurisdictions can discuss and work together to develop
best practices.99 This, theoretically, would lead to the most efficient investor
protection regimes.100 Compliance with two or more sets of disclosure requirements
makes it harder and more costly to comply with both when investing across
borders.101 If jurisdictions do not work together to some extent, investors will be
able to expose gaps and differences in systems and conduct regulatory arbitrage. 102
From the regulators’ perspective, some countries may not have the resources to
regulate and supervise a complex financial system. 103 By having international
regulatory convergence, these smaller countries can utilize the frameworks already
in place and adopt the sophisticated frameworks to adequately regulate and
encourage complex financing.104
B. Benefits of International Regulatory Divergence
The new regulatory frameworks show that there is a divergence relating to the
requirement of risk retention in securitization transactions. However, this may not
be a bad thing. There is uncertainty as to what is the best method to regulate
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banks.105 This problem is unlikely to ever be solved fully due to the constant change
of financial markets and products.106 Prior to the recent financial collapse, the Basel
Accords facilitated bank regulation harmonization.107 This resulted in nearly all
large banks following similar strategies with regard to international securitization. 108
Banks and other financial institutions adopted bad strategies, such as the OTD
model, because there was precedent, and until the collapse, the strategy appeared to
be working. Additionally, gaps in international regulation exposed more investors to
the risks of fraud.109 When these business strategies failed, the failure was not
restricted to investments in one state. Rather, the failure was felt throughout the
world and the global economy suffered.110 By having different regulatory regimes,
there is a greater likelihood that not all of the regulators will make the same
mistake.111 This will help reduce international systemic risk and help test different
strategies in the pursuit to find the best practices.112
C. Should there be Convergence?
When asking whether there should be international convergence in rules, it is
important to determine to what the rules would converge. For the purposes of this
paper, I will focus on the concept of risk retention and simplify the examination as to
whether regimes should require risk retention. For the reasons noted above,
requiring risk retention in securitization appears to be a better policy than not
requiring risk retention. A large body of literature has been written describing how
requiring originators to bear a proportion of the risk of the assets they create is
beneficial.113 However, there is no way to be sure that the upside to aligning banks’
interests with that of investors outweighs the disadvantages. With all the benefits of
requiring risk retention, there are also benefits to not requiring risk retention. 114
There is also little to no literature showing that five percent is an optimal retention
amount. The lack of risk retention allows more access to credit for investors in a
tough market. Banks would also be able to make more profits in a time where they
are hurting. The divergence in possible best practices makes it more favorable that
the two systems do not converge, at least initially, until one of the regulations is
shown to work better in practice.
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There are benefits to not having international convergence on financial regulation
in general as discussed above. Because of the benefits, Basel III’s position to not
require risk retention may benefit the overall financial industry. By allowing
different regulatory regimes, local jurisdictions can tailor rules to best meet their
needs and desires.115 By having multiple systems and rules, different regimes can be
tested in practice. Best practices can then be discovered and utilized by jurisdictions
as they are proven. In the present case, if the risk retention leads to better assetbacked securities being issued, and this creates a better banking system than in
countries that lack the risk retention, the Dodd-Frank Act will be vindicated, and
other countries will likely adopt the regulation. If countries that do not have a risk
retention requirement generate high-quality asset-backed securities, and lead to a
more fluid and profitable financial system, then Basel III will be vindicated and the
U.S. can remove the risk retention requirement.
Even though risk retention appears to be the better policy, it has yet to be tested,
and as such, uncertainty exists whether it is a preferable policy in practice. Further,
there are benefits to not having international convergence that will help avoid
another international financial collapse. In light of these two considerations, the
different policies between the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III with regard to risk
retention appears to be a beneficial divergence.
IX. CONCLUSION
The OTD model of banking led to significant securitization and the creation of
many poorly performing loans. The poor performance of these loans was a major
cause of the recent financial collapse. In response, both the Dodd-Frank Act and
Basel III were passed to better regulate banks. Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act
contained a provision that required banks to maintain five percent risk retention in
securitizations whereas Basel III has no such risk retention requirement. Although
both regulations require banks to maintain higher capital levels, without requiring
the banks to hold skin in the game, the raised capital levels will do little to prevent
banks from securitizing their loans. Banks are able to circumvent the system
because churning loans allows banks to sell their receivables in exchange for capital,
thereby meeting their capital requirements. As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act does a
better job of addressing the problems inherent in the OTD model of banking.
There are still drawbacks to the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk retention requirement.
Securitization was a useful financial tool that allowed banks to be more profitable,
allowed borrowers better access to loans, and allowed non-institutional investors to
invest in the mortgage market. By requiring risk retention, the Dodd Frank Act will
inhibit the securitization market. Banks will likely be unable to churn loans as much
as they would without the risk retention. Since the financial market is still reeling
from the recent collapse, this could further inhibit an economic rebound. A
divergence in regulatory regimes can prevent a systemic downturn. Additionally,
having the two regimes test the two different regulations will prove, in practice,
which is actually the better policy. As one regulation proves itself, the other
regulatory framework can adopt it. The lack of convergence between Basel III and
the Dodd Frank Act with regard to risk retention can be beneficial for international
banking.
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